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Economic theory implies that research and development (R&D) efforts increase firm 
productivity and ultimately profits. In particular, R&D expenses lead to the development of 
intellectual property (IP) and IP commands a return that increases overall profits of the firm. 
This hypothesis is investigated for the North American automotive supplier industry by 
analyzing a panel of 5000 firms for the years 1950 to 2011. 
Results indicate that R&D expenses in fact increase profitability at the firm level. In particular, 
increases in the R&D expense to sales ratio lead to increases in the profit contribution of 
intangible assets relative to sales. This indicates that more R&D intensive IP should command 
higher royalty rates per sales when licensed to third parties and within multinational enterprises 
alike. 
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The effects of R&D investments on productivity have long been the focus of research. There 
exists consensus theoretically that R&D investments increase productivity both in the aggregate 
and on the firm level and that is generally confirmed by empirical studies; see e.g. Griliches 
(1998) and Mairesse/Sassenou (1991) for an overview. However, due to conceptual problems 
with the central R&D capital model (based on production functions) and econometric problems 
such as endogeneity and data heterogeneity, much of the empirical work thus far presented 
remains controversial; see e.g. Griliches (1998), chapter 12. 
This investigation does not try to identify the underlying production function but focuses 
instead on the profit and return structure resulting from earlier monetary and tangible capital 
formation treating the residual difference between the total value of assets of the firm and the 
sum of monetary and tangible assets as intellectual property (IP) capital. Total return to all 
assets is then decomposed using the weighted average cost of capital concept to yield a residual 
return on the IP asset. For a definition of intellectual property, we can refer, e.g., to Clarkson 
(2001) who states: “Intellectual property law identifies five major sources legal protection: 
patents, trademarks, industrial designs, confidential information/trade secrets, and copyright” (p. 
5) and “Intellectual asset rights for a technology can be licensed“ (p. 7) and from those 
transactions value can be imputed.  
Econometric problems of earlier studies are partly avoided by simply using a much larger data 
set, both across sections (several thousand firms) and within time-series (up to 11 years of 
average time observations per firm). 
I principally follow Clarkson (2001), who presents a model to test the relationship between the 
R&D-to-sales ratio and the profit contribution of intangible assets as percentage of sales. He 




finds that this relationship is significant and positive for the pharmaceutical industry and I apply 
the same methodology to the North American automotive supplier industry. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the economic and 
institutional background, the resulting research questions posed here, as well as the hypotheses 
to be investigated. The underlying theory is presented in Section 3. Section 4 describes the data 
used. Section 5 presents the general modeling and summarizes the results. Section 6 concludes. 
Statistical and econometric results are presented in the appendix. 
 
2. Background and research questions 
In general, there is a large body of theoretical and empirical economic research showing that 
profitability increases with R&D expense; a large part of this is summarized in 
Hall/Mairesse/Mohnen (2010), Griliches (1998) and Mairesse/Sassenou (1991). The underlying 
mechanism lies in the build-up of R&D capital – in the form of intangible assets or intellectual 
property (IP) – as a result of R&D activities. Hall/Mairesse (2009) use Compustat data for about 
5600 manufacturing, trade, and services firms for the years 1996 to 2005 and find significant 
positive effects of past R&D intensity on gross margins and EBIT margins. For the automotive 
industry, e.g. Jaruzelski et al. (2005) report that firms with above average R&D to sales ratios 
have on average a greater gross margin than those with below average R&D/sales. 
Other research establishes “that intangible asset capitalization is associated with market values. 
In other words, market participants behave as if parts of R&D, labor and advertising 
expenditures were treated as assets that represent significant future economic benefits to the 
firm”; see Sydler et al. (2014) in an analysis of the pharmaceutical industry; see also e.g. Lev 
and Sougiannis (1996). 




Other research, in turn, establishes a relationship between profit margins and royalty rates for 
intangible assets; see Kemmerer/Lu (2008) and Goldscheider et al. (2002). For example, using 
data from RoyaltySource and Compustat for 21 years up to 2007, Kemmerer/Lu report that for a 
sample of 3800 firms from 14 4-digit SIC industries, average royalty rates lie between 25 
percent of gross margin and 25 percent of EBIT margin. Regressing the royalty rates on EBIT 
margins yields a stable result of 50 percent whereas Goldscheider et al. (2002) present the well-
known 25-percent rule. The 25-percent rule states that when licencing IP, a license should be set 
such that 25% of resulting profits go to the licensor and 75% to the licensee; see also 
Goldscheider (2011) who argued that this rule reflects commonly accepted practice in many 
industries. 
Based on these two bodies of research, it can be shown that profit margins as percentage of 
sales are increasing in R&D intensities i.e. in R&D spending as percentage of sales. Clarkson 
(2001) shows this for the pharmaceutical industry and concludes that increases in R&D 
intensity lead to increases in the contribution of intellectual property (or intangible assets) to 
profits measured as percentage of sales (CPIA); a one percent increase in R&D intensity tends 
to increase CPIA by half a percent. This is consistent with the Sydler et al. (2014) analysis of 
the pharmaceutical industry showing that R&D expenditures lead to the formation of IP assets 
which in turn increase a firm’s returns relative to book value. 
These general observations should principally also hold for the automotive industry; compare 
e.g. Kroninger (2016), Egeland and Matshede (2015), PwC (2008). However, also due to the 
historically increasing role of IP for this industry, changes over time of the relatioinship 
between IP and profitability including structural breaks are to be expected; compare Sydler et 
al. (2014), Cadogan (2010). 
 




3. Theoretical Basis 
Following Clarkson (2001) we can equate a firm’s total cost of capital with its total return on 
assets: 










where 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 is the weighted average cost of capital, 𝑉𝑖 denotes the value of IP (IP capital), 
𝑉𝑚 denotes monetary assets, 𝑉𝑡𝑎𝑛 denotes tangible assets, 𝑉𝑡 denotes total assets, 𝑟𝑖 denotes 
return on 𝑉𝑖, 𝑟𝑚 denotes the return on 𝑉𝑚, and 𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛 denotes the return on 𝑉𝑡𝑎𝑛. 
The left-hand side of equation (1) represents the WACC as the weighted cost of the liability 
side of the balance sheet; this is defined in detail in equations (4) to (6) below. Compare e.g. 
Munn (2002) for traditional WACC approaches. This is equated with the ride-hand side of 
equation (1) as the weighted sum of returns on the asset side of the balance sheet. The WACC 
is then treated like a known variable and equation (1) is rearranged to yield the following: 










Since this is derived from equation costs to returns (the liability to the asset side of the 
balance sheet), we do not make specific assumptions about financing structure and need not 
evoke Modigliani-Miller (1958, 1963) for a capital structure irrelevance assumption. 
We can now define the contribution of profits due to intangible assets as a share of sales, CPIA, 
as  
(3)  𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 = 𝑟𝑖 ∗ (
𝑉𝑖
𝑉𝑡
)/𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝐴𝑇/𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 
where EBIAT is profit before interest but after taxes and represents debt-free net income, i.e. 
net income plus interest expense after tax. 




Given information on 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶, 𝑉𝑡, 𝑉𝑚 𝑟𝑚, 𝑉𝑡𝑎𝑛, 𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛 and 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝐴𝑇, 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 can be calculated. With 
information on R&D expense and sales, the relationship between CPIA and the R&D expense 
to sales ratio can be investigated. Note that in contrast to other studies, such as Sydler et al. 
(2014), a separate calculation of a measure of IP Capital is not necessary. 
The US t-bill rate can be used for measuring 𝑟𝑚 and the US t-bond rate for measuring 𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛 as 
well as the risk-free rate of interest rf (used to calculate individual firm WACC values).  
The 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 can be calculated as 
(4) 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = (1 − 𝑑𝑎) ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐸 + 𝑑𝑎 ∗ (1 − 𝑡) ∗ 𝑟𝑚 
(5) 
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with an assumed average tax rate of t=0.4, da is the debt to Vt ratio, Dt is total debt, and roe is 
the rate of return to equity. Following Damodaran (2011a, 2011b) and Lutz (2012a, 2012b), roe 
can be expressed by: 
(6) 𝑅𝑂𝐸 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛼 ∗ 𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐸 
where individual return volatility per firm is calculated as the moving standard deviation of the 
ratio of net income to total equity. 
 
4. The Data 
I analyze North-American firm level data from Compustat for the NAICS code range 334000 to 
336999. The data set spans the years 1950 to 2011 and includes over 5000 firms. About 75% of 
that data spans the years 1980 to 2010; so there are fewer observations in earlier years and in the 
last year of the sample. However, all observations from all years are included in the estimations; 




using only data from 1980 to 2010 for estimations would not qualitatively change the results 
(not reported in the paper). 
Data on US treasury bills and bonds is taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. 
A full list of data sources utilized and data obtained is given in Table 1 in the appendix. A list 
of variables used is given in Table 2 in the appendix.  
Summary statistics are provided in Tables 3a and 3b. These include descriptive time-series 
data of our sample on numbers of firms per year and related R&D expense and profitability 
variables.  
 
5. Modeling and results 
Given the panel data available, we can use the following generalized regression model to 
investigate the economic hypotheses presented: 
(8) , , ,i t i i t t i t iy F G M         
where the dependent variable tiy ,  is a profit or sales level indicator (e.g. EBIT, sales, or profit 
margin) of company i in period t; iF  is a vector of determinants specific to firm i but invariant 
over time (such as country or industry); tiG ,  is a vector of determinants that may vary 
between firms and also over time (e.g., R&D expense); tM  is a vector of period-specific 
determinants outside of a particular firm (e.g. global economic factors and market indicators); 
ti, is an idiosyncratic error term that may vary between firms and also over time and is 
independently distributed with E( ti, ) = 0; and i  represents unobserved heterogeneity across 
firms, i.e., a company specific random effect that is independently distributed. 




For the detailed model specification of equation (8) in Section 5, let I= number of firms, T = 
number of years, (TxI) the product of T and I; let β, ,  be the number of included F, G, and 
M variables, respectively. The general model specification in Section 5 inludes a constant , 
line vectors (1xβ), (1x), (1x), matrixes F(βx(TxI)), G(x(TxI)), M(x(TxI)), and 
column vectors Y, ,  with dimension (1x(TxI)). The exact number of variables per model 
varies with the models and is reported in Tables 4.1-4.4. 
This general specification allows for either random-effects (RE) or fixed-effects (FE) modeling, 
where the random or fixed effects are firm-specific components. The more general approach is 
to allow for random firm-specific effects; the case where these effects are fixed, that is 
determinate constants instead of random variables, is a special sub-case. All model variants 
reported below were estimated with both FE and RE panel models. All models are estimated 
also with lagged explanatory variables to capture the effects of past research expenditure on 
present firm performance and profits. All models were also run with controls for years in order 
to address historical differences and structural breaks. Compare e.g. Cadogan (2010) or Sydler 
et al. (2014) for related discussions on model specifications. 
Controlling model estimations for years also aims at addressing the value reference issue as 
discussed in Lev and Sougiannis (1996) and Ciftci, et al (2014). This issue includes the 
observation that “R-squared is lower for intangible-intensive industries than for non-intangible-
intensive industries and has declined over time for intangible-intensive industries” (Ciftci, et al, 
Abstract). 
The data available contains several firm-specific, time-invariant variables that can be assumed 
to capture a significant part of present fixed effects (e.g. country, industry indicators, functional 
dummies, etc.). Hence a random-effects specification seems to be a priori more appropriate. 
However, Hausman tests for FE versus RE modeling undertaken for the models reported below 




(not reported here) tend to reject the null of consistency in the RE modeling – consequently the 
FE models reported should be considered more reliable. Estimations and results are summarized 
below. 
In a first exercise, I investigated the principal effect of R&D spending on profit, sales, and the 
profit-sales margin. Estimations yielding the following results are reported in Table 4.1. 
1)  A one-percent increase in R&D spending tends to increase EBIT by ½ to ¾ percent 
2)  A one-percent increase in R&D spending tends to increase sales by 0.1 to 0.4 percent 
3)  A one-percent increase in R&D-sales ratio tends to increase the EBIT-sales margin by ¼ to 
1/2 percent 
The first two relations have been estimated with IV RE and FE models using logs in the 
variables and they explain over 80% of the EBIT variation and over 90% of the sales variation 
in the data. 
In a second exercise, I follow Clarkson’s methodology in order to isolate the effect of R&D 
spending on the value of intangible assets and the return to intangible assets. According to the 
step-by-step procedure applied, I report several sets of regressions: 
1)  Regressions in logs show that R&D increases EBIT and sales, but EBIT by a larger 
percentage. These regressions explain at least 80% of variation in all model setups. It 
follows that R&D increases the EBIT margin! The corresponding estimations are reported 
in the first four models in Tables 4.1. and 4.2., respectively.  
2)  Additional regressions of EBIT-sales margin against lagged R&D expenditure as share of 
sales show that past R&D-sales ratios significantly influence present EBIT-sales margins. 
The corresponding estimations are reported in the last two models in Tables 4.1. and 4.2., 
respectively. 




3)  Regressions of intangible asset levels (measured as total assets minus tangible and current 
assets) against past R&D levels indicate that past R&D explains at 75% of current 
intangible asset values (for the Delphi data set). Intangible asset values are increasing in 
R&D! Undertaking the regressions from set 3 with sales ratios also yields significant 
positive results with the R&D-sales ratio explaining about a quarter of the intangible-asset-
sales ratio. The corresponding estimations are reported in Table 4.3.   
4)  Lastly, CPIA – contributions to profit by intangible asset – values following the method of 
Clarkson have been calculated. The wacc/roe calculations were done following Damodaran 
(2012b) and Lutz (2012b) where roe= tbond-rate +alpha*risk and risk is measured as the 
individual firm’s volatility of returns to capital. Here the results show a stable positive 
relationship between the R&D-sales ratio and CPIA. The corresponding estimations are 
reported in Table 4.4. 
According to the model estimates, an increase of one percent in the R&D to sales ratio increases 
the profit contributions of intangible assets by 1/4 to 1.25 percent of sales. The models explain 
between one third and half of the variation in the profit contributions of intangible assets. 
 
6. Conclusions 
I conclude that there is strong evidence that firm profits, profit margins and the contributions by 
returns to IP increase with R&D in the automotive (supplier) industry. While the reverse 
causality – from past sales and profits to current R&D expenditure – may also be present, our 
model specifications examined the relationships between past R&D expenditures over several 
years with current sales and profits and the results obtained appear to be robust. 
These results in turn imply that royalty rates (as percentage of sales) should increase in R&D 
intensity (as percentage of sales). This is so because licensors and licensees often negotiate 




royalty rates to target a stable profit split (Goldscheider et al. (2002) and therefore a stable 
positive relationship between profit (shares) and royalties can be observed (Kemmerer/Lu 
(2008)). For the automotive industry, royalty rates to target a stable profit split are also 
common; this has been confirmed to me during several expert interviews with managers from 
the US automotive industry conducted in 2012. 
In conclusion, there is strong support for the notion that royalty rates (as percentage of sales) 
should increase in R&D intensity (as percentage of sales) of the licensor that created the 
licensed IP, because the profits (sales margins) to be gained by exploitation of the IP tend to 
increase in R&D intensity.  
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Table 1. Data sources 
# Data type Source Downloaded / data Date 












(Data set: compm/funda/ ann / Jan 1950 - 
Jan 2012, TIC, all, NAICS ge 33000 and 










International Monetary Fund (2012): 
International Financial Statistics 
(Edition: August 2012).  ESDS 
International, University of Manchester.  
DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.5257/imf/ifs/20
12-08. Annual IFS series. Table title: 




     
 
  
                                                 
2
 Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) was used in preparing part of the data set used in the research reported 
in this paper. This service and the data available thereon constitute valuable intellectual property and trade secrets 
of WRDS and/or its third-party suppliers. 




Table 2. List of variables 
Variable Definition 
Firm group(gvkey)         
fyear Fiscal year        
at Assets - Total       
ebit Earnings Before Interest and Taxes     
ni Net Income (Loss)       
ppegt Property, Plant and Equipment - Total (Gross)   
sale Sales/Turnover (Net)        
txt Income Taxes - Total      
xrd Research and Development Expense      
mkvalt Market Value - Total - Fiscal    
loc Current ISO Country Code - Headquarters    
naics North American Industry Classification Code     
naicsn North American Industry Classification Code     
sic Standard Industry Classification Code      
state State/Province         
seq Stockholders Equity - Total 
ebiat ebit-txt         
rshf ni/seq         
std3rshf 3-period standard deviation of rshf 
xrds xrd/sale         
countryn group(loc)         
roe tbond+0.3*std3rshf         
da 1-seq/at         
wacc da*(1-0.4)*tbill+(1-da)*roe         
ai mkvalt-act-ppegt         
ais ai/sale         
margin ebit/sale         





TBillRate_ifs Treasury bill rate, percent per annum 
TBondRate10y_ifs Ten year government bond yield, percent per annum 
tbond TBondRate10y_ifs*100         
tbill TBillRate_ifs*100 
  




Table 3a. Summary statistics (selected variables) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
firm 54385 1937.03 1373.78 2 5144 
fyear 54385 1992.87 11.0166 1950 2011 
at 54365 1540.02 10870.2 0 479921 
ebit 54385 99.1433 639.385 -12193 33790 
ni 54372 40.6556 831.674 -85162 104821 
ppegt 54192 766.367 5336.22 0 200717 
sale 54385 1366.04 8000.68 -0.019 262394 
txt 54379 29.2095 251.44 -5878 37162 
xrd 54385 66.5922 402.967 -0.307 10924 
mkvalt 18319 1916.6 10075.8 0.0007 467093 
naicsn 54385 334773 1838.61 331000 339999 
ebiat 54379 69.942 520.803 -37506 25507 
rshf 53905 0.01793 35.6914 -894 7770.33 
avg3rshf 46781 0.02467 32.8783 -5380 1850.22 
std3rshf 46763 1.88655 40.4585 0.00138 5376.07 
xrds 53440 0.97124 26.3349 -218.74 3309 
countryn 54385 34.6064 7.35702 1 40 
roe 46763 0.63405 12.1373 0.02934 1612.9 
da 50108 0.44174 0.22225 0 1 
wacc 43804 0.15616 2.45843 0.00377 473.162 
ai 18128 610.989 8732.42 -248669 452978 
ais 17676 26.6996 600.3 -643.63 55726.2 
margin 53440 -2.3929 63.8009 -8869 394.474 
nmargin 53427 -2.8388 81.8323 -8684 1332 
cpia_req 15850 11.6948 599.408 -32816 43263.7 
ria 16011 0.0003 16.5845 -1842.6 546.594 
cpia 15849 -4.525 172.431 -15162 1276.43 
tbond 54331 0.06857 0.02557 0.02402 0.13911 








Table 3b. Time series statistics (selected variables) 
 
Fiscal year No. firms R&D expense to 
sales 
WACC Return on equity Return on intangible 
assets 
  Average Average Average  Average 
1950 8 .0204968    
1951 13 .02198378    
1952 15 .02670928    
1953 18 .02906584    
1954 24 .03586493    
1955 31 .03202328    
1956 33 .03154611    
1957 33 .04017907    
1958 33 .04181862    
1959 33 .04159643    
1960 39 .04160234    
1961 41 .04679791    
1962 52 .04622581    
1963 52 .04645989 .02864825 .17208183  
1964 57 .04920585 .10899481 .25640983  
1965 63 .04874116 .05391879 .22246505  
1966 66 .04851276 .05825473 .22454052  
1967 75 .08239294 .06071714 .23643387  
1968 90 .08917022 .65010324 .2493162  
1969 96 .0738535 .09441627 .22930614  
1970 234 .11051225 .08182723 .19859182  
1971 399 .04489734 .06930722 .07847149  
1972 491 .03647877 .08356062 .17674221  
1973 570 .03088553 .08789939 .17757471  
1974 767 .03039975 .08542425 .25684577  
1975 773 .04461636 .0862524 .23443135  
1976 786 .0348744 .08768999 .23204745  
1977 771 .0338756 .08799722 .25934549  
1978 790 .04895852 .1070427 .35725399  
1979 835 .05608803 .1230126 .28441881  
1980 902 .19702149 .1271205 .07377574  
1981 967 .20699333 .1578595 .22771068  
1982 1,125 .1963603 .14928191 .18846223  
1983 1,234 2.5818267 .1507463 .01000474  
1984 1,303 .16734036 .14274375 .70449239  
1985 1,416 .273632 .12656434 1.5048382  
1986 1,454 .24962976 .11512106 -.26264632  
1987 1,458 .35313462 .1190283 -4.4204179  
1988 1,408 .57976732 .13974224 .03014611  
1989 1,401 .85735083 .15628584 .06333706  
1990 1,401 .38375859 .12476007 -.08291916  
1991 1,445 .45082161 .11949236 .21660423  
1992 1,514 .54486757 .16002771 .14682146  
1993 1,600 .72671998 .19195474 -.04193248  
1994 1,706 .30442691 .15495376 -.18527267  
1995 1,875 .93851863 .11666554 .10142158  
1996 1,891 2.3944955 .14406699 .03705963  
1997 1,854 .90751209 .17390201 .06661403  
1998 1,930 1.6429378 .12287624 .49942974 .14638078 
1999 1,873 1.3558145 .15618603 1.245576 -1.0583237 
2000 1,780 3.0436565 .27939962 -.02299623 .2732389 
2001 1,702 1.1359925 .16319402 .09701145 .09238216 
2002 1,663 1.7278879 .19004077 .61870458 -.56223728 
2003 1,636 1.1650982 .19133156 .12040953 .20275462 
2004 1,616 .95939638 .5116775 -2.1612725 .7115438 
2005 1,584 1.3623727 .24004927 -.06237868 .08639784 
2006 1,524 1.5625884 .13170451 .8426404 .15784096 
2007 1,465 .84572506 .12837754 .20063137 .10019286 
2008 1,423 1.8705099 .09527514 .01448189 .0022496 
2009 1,392 3.0177079 .08986617 .04448965 .11467628 
2010 1,291 .86667218 .14503386 -.11239394 -.29530764 
2011 264 2.3628166 .1056944 .10837632 .38675232 




Table 4.1. Results: Effects of R&D on EBIT, sales, and margins (1) 
 












Dep. Variable lnebit lnebit lnsale lnsale margin margin 
       
lnxrd 0.7434*** 0.5640*** 0.4445*** 0.0792***   
lnebit (-1) 0.0984** 0.4286***   
  
lnsale (-1)   0.4443*** 0.9064***   
margin (-1)     0.1684*** 0.2653*** 
xrds (-1)     0.2731*** 0.5391*** 
       
Observations 1252 1252 1602 1602 31741 31741 
Groups (Firms) 384 384 467 467 2725 2725 
R-sq. within 0.3597 0.3464 0.8506 0.8453 0.0110 0.0145 
R-sq. between 0.8068 0.8894 0.9349 0.9861 0.0127 0.0006 
R-sq. overall 0.8243 0.8864 0.9499 0.9892 0.0191 0.0106 
Prob > chi2 (>F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Notes. (i) Models (1), (3), and (6) estimated with fixed effects; Models (2), (4) and (5) estimated with 
random effects. Models (1) to (4) IV regressions with lnxrd instrumented by lagged observations of 
lnre, lnam, lntlcf and other variables. (ii) All equations include a constant and controls for years. (iii) 
*** denotes significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 10% level. 
 
  





















lnebit lnsale lnebit lnsale margin margin 
       
lnxrd (-1) 0.2547*** 0.1067*** 0.2253*** 0.0805***   
lnebit (-1) 0.5036***  0.6480***    
lnsale (-1)  0.7367***  0.8178***   
margin (-1)     0.1907*** 0.2136*** 
xrds (-1)     0.3934*** 0.3946*** 
xrds (-2)     -0.0010 -0.0220*** 
xrds (-3)     0.0069 0.0000 
       
Observations 29769 47515 29769 47515 39921 39921 
Groups 
(Firms) 
2985 4056 2985 4056 3491 3491 
R-sq. within 0.5165 0.7890 0.5143 0.7884 0.0051 0.0037 
R-sq. 
between 
0.9123 0.9677 0.9240 0.9688 0.0000 0.0364 
R-sq. overall 0.8690 0.9617 0.8755 0.9632 0.0012 0.0057 
Prob > chi2 
(>F) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Notes. (i) Models (1), (2), and (5) estimated with fixed effects; Models (2), (3) and (6) estimated with 
random effects. (ii) All equations include a constant and controls for years. (iii) *** denotes 
significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 10% level. 
 
  



















Dep. Variable lnai lnai ais ais ais ais 
       
lnxrd (-1) 0.0881*** 0.5277***     
xrds   6.1616*** 7.8259*** 6.3858*** 8.2368*** 
xrds (-1)   -0.3285***  -0.1039  
xrds (-2)   2.1246***  2.1011***  
       
Observations 10217 10217 16481 17676 16481 17676 
Groups (Firms) 1940 1940 2330 2462 2330 2462 
R-sq. within 0.0026 0.0026 0.2876 0.0879 0.2873 0.0879 
R-sq. between 0.5837 0.5837 0.2127 0.1865 0.2171 0.1865 
R-sq. overall 0.5384 0.5384 0.2806 0.1376 0.2817 0.1376 
Prob > chi2 (>F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Notes. (i) Models (1), (3), and (4) estimated with fixed effects; Models (2), (5) and (6) estimated with 
random effects. (ii) All equations include a constant and controls for years. (iii) *** denotes 
significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 10% level. 
  



















Dep. Variable cpia cpia cpia cpia cpia cpia 
       
cpia (-1) 0.0296*** 0.0296*** 0.0296*** 0.7465*** 0.7465*** 0.7465*** 
xrds (-1) 0.3582*** 0.3083*** 0.2619*** 1.1250*** 1.1203*** 1.0999*** 
xrds (-2) 0.2616 0.1162  -0.2294 -0.2898*  
xrds (-3) 0.0017   -0.0549   
       
Observations 12928 13145 13333 12928 13145 13333 
Groups (Firms) 1919 1961 1985 1919 1961 1985 
R-sq. within 0.0042 0.0032 0.0024 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 
R-sq. between 0.6235 0.7446 0.8545 0.9864 0.9875 0.9877 
R-sq. overall 0.2409 0.2973 0.3563 0.5731 0.5731 0.5727 
Prob > chi2 (>F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Notes. (i) Models (1), (2), and (3) estimated with fixed effects; Models (4), (5) and (6) estimated with 
random effects. Models (1) to (4) IV regressions with lnxrd  instrumented by lagged observations of 
lnre, lnam, lntlcf and other variables. (ii) All equations include a constant and controls for years. (iii) 
*** denotes significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 10% level. 
 
